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This paper uses the city level roll-out of legal service grants to evaluate their 
effects on crime.  Using Uniform Crime Reports from 1960 to 1985, the results 
show that there is a short run increase of 7 percent in crimes reported and also a 
13 percent increase in crimes cleared by arrest.  Results show an increase in the 
staffing of police officers in cities that received legal services.  These cities are 
also associated with having higher median property values 10 years later.  This 
supports the narrative that legal services changed police behavior through 
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“Legal Services Lawyers have won the confidence of angry 
young men and women and have channeled their 
grievances into democratic procedures.  This capability 
and achievement mark a major victory for those concerned 
with maintaining law and order.”  
– From the Office of Economic Opportunity, 
November 1969 Senate Hearing 
“You can carry a machete through the streets of Newark 
and not get locked up”  
– Mr. Kowalewski, New York Times 1967  
After decades of decline, reported crime in the United States began to rise 
in the early 1960s.  The rise in violent crime, especially homicide, pushed crime 
to the forefront of political debates (Grimes & Loo 2004).  Accompanying the rise 
in crime, was a series of civil demonstrations that escalated into wide spread riots 
during the summer of 1964.  Riots in Harlem, Rochester, and Philadelphia 
presented political obstacles for launching President Johnson’s War on Poverty.
1
  
Relatedly, the response of law and order to riots and rioters created more tension 
between blacks in urban areas and local police officers (O’Reilly, 1988).  
Concerns over the decline of urban communities and eruptions of urban violence 
resulted in the inclusion of experimental programs within the War on Poverty that 
would reduce the likelihood of riots.   
In 1965 the Neighborhood Legal Services Program (LSP) was introduced 
to provide the poor with legal channels to remediate grievances, especially those 
resulting in riots (Gillette, 1996).
2
  Historically, the poor had limited access to 
legal institutions due to financial constraints and discrimination.  Many viewed 
the lack of legal recourse produced demonstrations that escalated into riots in poor 
                                                 
1
 Riots occurred in Harlem and Rochester in July of 1964 and in Philadelphia in August of 1964.  
The Economic Opportunity Act was signed into law in August of 1964. 
2
 The Legal Services Program was not included in the initial introduction of programs under the 
War on Poverty. 
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black communities.  In response, the LSP was mandated to facilitate better 
relationships between the bureaucracies and the poor that they affected.   
The legal services program was introduced with an annual budget of 20 
million dollars and by 1975 there existed over 600 offices with a budget over 70 
million dollars.  Although the size and scope of the program has gone through 
many changes, it still exists as the Legal Services Corporation.  As of 2013, there 
are over 800 offices located in fifty states with an annual program budget of 365 
million dollars.
3
  Donald Baker, chief counsel of the Office of Economic 
Opportunity believed that the LSP would “have more impact on the total structure 
of our social, economic, and political structures than anything else that OEO and 
perhaps even the federal government has done on the domestic scene.”
4
  
However, despite over 50 years of operations, little can be said about the actual 
impact of the program.  This is in part due to lack of data on the users of the LSP, 
and to a greater extant, the lack of convincing measures of legal services 
themselves.  Pertinent questions remain to be answered: did the LSP mitigate the 
urban decline that occurred as a result of racial riots in the 1960s?  Did the LSP 
improve the welfare of the poor?   
This paper is the first to quantitatively evaluate the impact of the LSP on 
the quality of life of the poor.  I use newly collected data on the communities 
receiving legal service grants between 1965 and 1975, and I focus on crime as a 
measurement of quality of life for several reasons.  First, crime captures actions 
that negatively affect individual welfare, including threats to individual safety and 
personal property.  Second, crime is one of the few measures of well-being 
consistently recorded over time at the city level for the period of interest.  Lastly, 
crime was an outcome linked to the LSP by advocates and opponents.  In addition 
to crime rates, I provide evidence of the impact of the LSP on other measures of 
                                                 
3
 Information provided by the Legal Service Corporation 2013 Annual Report  
4
 See Gillette (1996) 
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welfare, such as property values.  Past literature has shown property values to be 
negatively related to crime (Pope & Pope, 2010).  More so, the evaluation of 
property values sheds light on the influence of the legal service program on riots 
and urban decline.   
My research design takes advantage of the differential timing of the LSP 
implementation in cities across the United States and uses a before and after 
design to analyze changes in outcomes after the establishment of the LSP.  I use 
an event-study framework (Jacobson et al. 1993) which provides a statistical 
description of the evolution of pre-trends in outcomes as well as the dynamics of 
changes after the program began.  My results show that there is a short run 
increase in criminal offenses reported and offenses cleared by arrest after LSP 
grants are received.  Cities that receive LSP grants are associated with a 7 percent 
increase in the number of crimes reported and a 13 percent increase in offenses 
cleared by arrest 3 years after a grant is received.  After 4 years, reported crime 
and arrests decrease and evolve similarly to untreated cities.   
These findings may reflect two different phenomena: an increase in actual 
crime (consistent with critics and the second quote above) or an increase in the 
reporting of crime (consistent with advocates and first quote above).  Although it 
is difficult to disentangle changes in crime versus changes in reporting, the event-
study specification provides insight into the evolution of crime after the LSP was 
established.  The intertemporal response of crime and arrest after LSP is 
implemented displays an immediate increase in reported crime and arrest 
followed by a large decrease in reported crime.  This hump-shape response is 
consistent with an increase in reporting followed by a decrease in actual crime.  
This is similar to Levitt’s (1998) emphasis on changes in reporting behavior due 
to changes in likelihood that a crime will be solved.  Second, there is an 
immediate increase in the staffing of police officers in cities that received 
federally funded legal services which has been shown to be inversely related to 
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crime (Levitt 1997, 2002, McCrary 2002, 2013).  Third, consistent with changes 
in police effort, I find that the increase in arrests is twice as large as the increase 
in reported crime. 
Additional evidence is also consistent with legal services programs 
increasing social capital and improving welfare.  I provide evidence of a positive 
relationship between the LSPs and property values.  Collin and Margo (2007) 
showed that the median property values for black owned owners as well as all 
residents within a city were negatively affected by the 1960s race riots.  My 
results support their finding as well as shows that places that received legal 
services in the 1960s and 1970s had higher property values in 1980 relative to 
cities that never received legal services.  According to my results, race riots 
decreased property values by 6 percent and legal service increased property 
values by 3 percent.  Furthermore, locations that received legal services earlier 
had higher property values in 1980 relative to those that received legal services 
later in the sample period.  This final piece of evidence is consistent with LSPs 
mitigating the consequences of riots that reduced the quality of life inner city 
neighborhoods and contributed to improving the well-being of the poor. 
Evaluations of social policies from the War on Poverty provides important 
information about short and long term effect that can guide contemporary crime 
and riot prevention policies.  Citizens in poor communities historically have had 
negative interactions with law enforcements and the Legal Service Program was a 
policy intervention that had success with changing police and community 
behavior.  Equally important, the legal service program provides a unique case 
study where a policy intervention provided impoverished groups additional 
security or access by ensuring that their legal rights were protected.  Intuitively, 
this protection does not only work to correct market inefficiencies but also 
increases demand for goods the poor previously lack access to.  By increasing 
access to welfare, housing, and proper police services, the poor indirectly benefits 
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from the reduction in the cost of lawyers.  For example, one expression of market 
inefficiency is the severe under reporting of crime.  Myers (1980) finds that the 
actual crime rates between 1970 and 1974 were 1.5 to 3 times larger than reported 
crime.  If some criminal offenses are under-reported due to lack of institutional 
responsibility or the victim perception of institutional responsibility, legal services 
would work to increase the number of crimes reported.
5
  Furthermore, the 
evaluation of the legal service program does not only provide an historical 
application of public policy but also fits into a larger literature in economics of 
evaluating social programs from the Great Society (Almond, Hoynes, and 
Schanzenbach 2011; Bailey and Goodman-Bacon 2013; Hoynes and Schanzebach 
2006; Ludwig and Miller 2007).   
I.  Brief History of Legal Services Under the War On Poverty 
A. Empowerment of the Poor through Legal Services 
The Federal Legal Services Program was motivated by an influential 
journal article by Jean and Edgar Cahn, which called for the “civilian perspective” 
to be incorporated in the War on Poverty (Cahn & Cahn, 1964).  The Cahns’ 
proposal was concerned with the potential of large bureaucracies generating 
monopoly power, concluding that the only way to protect the true interest of the 
poor was to provide them with accessible legal representation.  Giving the poor 
the ability to criticize, dissent, and compel responsiveness of local institutions 
would allow the poor to participate in helping themselves. 
The Cahns’ proposed that university-affiliated, neighborhood law firms be 
established to serve as intermediaries between the community and those 
administering social programs.  The law firms would provide professionals to aid 
in developing and stimulating leadership through opportunity, orientation, and 
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 Legal services lawyers have been seen as improving relationships between the community and 
the police.  Many encounters of how the LSP have influenced behavior of local institutions are 
documented in congress subcommittee meetings between 1965 to 1974. 
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training.  Each law firm would be staffed with lawyers, research assistants, and 
investigators with the goal of making public officials and private businesses more 
responsive to the needs of the poor.  Legal representation would be available for 
divorce, eviction, welfare fraud, police brutality, installment buying, and 
destroying the momentum of a “militant community effort.”
6
  The Cahns’ 
proposed that neighborhood law firms provide legal advocacy and legal analyses 
in four arenas: traditional legal assistance, law reform, law advocacy, and 
community outreach. 
Largely in response to the Cahns’ ideas, the Office of Economic 
Opportunity (OEO) launched the Neighborhood Legal Services Program as part 
of the Community Action Program (CAP).  Federal legal services grants went 
directly to community organizations and excluded local and state authorities, 
allowing federal funds to be spent rapidly.  The OEO delegated the choice of 
whether a local legal aid organization would run a Legal Services Project to local 
Community Action Agencies (CAA).
 7
  Implicitly, location and timing of these 
grants also were dependent on local political pressure and support from the local 
bar association.  Often, differences between the CAA and local bar associations 
generated confusion about where and when LSPs were established.  Once the 
National Bar Association fully backed the LSP, there was a greater effort to fund 
as many legal services grants as possible.
8
  This process, in which local bars and 
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 The deterrence of “militant community effort” refers to the availability of a lawyer to provide 
avenues for differences between the poor and various entities to use the political and judicial 
establishments to solve problems peacefully.  Proponents of Federally Funded Legal Services 
often boast of their success with ending or resolving differences that resulted in riots.   
7
 The OEO was responsible for the antipoverty programs and one of the largest initiatives was the 
Community Action Programs (CAP).  Community Action Programs are the bread and butter of the 
Anti-poverty movement. 
8
 It took two years for federally funded legal services to be fully operational due to opposition 




community action agencies influenced funding, resulted in a wide time variation 
of the establishment of the LSP in various cities (Johnson, 1974).   
The first year of legal services under OEO resulted in over 155 grants 
being issued.  The annual budget during the first year was 20 million, an amount 
that steadily increased each fiscal year.  In the second year, the budget for 
federally funded legal services was double the budget of the legal aid societies 
affiliated with the National Legal Aid Defender Association.  In 1967, the legal 
services program doubled in size, issuing over 300 grants with a budget of over 
40 million dollars.  By the end of 1967, the Federal LSP was funding 250 projects 
and providing legal assistance in 48 states.  
To gain a better understanding of how legal services funds were utilized, 
during the 1968 fiscal year a total of 282,000 cases were accepted.  Cases 
involving family problems – i.e. divorce, nonsupport, and paternity – represented 
nearly 40 percent of the cases.  Criminal and juvenile cases were responsible for 
over 18 percent of the cases.
9
  Administrative cases, which include cases that 
challenge laws and policies for welfare recipients and low skilled workers, 
accounted for only 7 percent of the total cases but were very effective.  A single 
administrative case potentially affected thousands of residents in a city, state, or 
across the country.  These cases usually involved challenging governmental 
agencies such as state and local welfare, social security, workman’s 
compensation, and unemployment insurance.  It must also be noted that 
neighborhood law firms could have had many indirect effects.  The availability of 
legal assistance may result in changes in business practice, educational 
disciplinary responses, and police policies even without litigation or long after 
litigation is resolved. 
B. Federally-Funded Legal Services and Crime 
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See Levitan (1969) for more information on the utilization of legal service grants.  
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The OEO funded neighborhood law firms were responsible for providing 
legal assistance in civil cases for individuals who were unable to afford private 
attorneys. Legal representation in criminal matters was provided by the state, 
however, these services were not always deemed as high quality.
10
  Legal services 
lawyers provided some form of legal assistance for alleged criminals when 
lawyers deemed that the state could not adequately represent clients with 
compelling cases.  Also, LSP lawyers were often called upon to provide 
pamphlets or information concerning citizen’s legal rights when interacting with 
the police.   
In addition, opponents of the program often criticized attorneys for 
inciting riots and emboldening criminals by providing them with legal counsel.  
Police officers in Newark and Los Angeles accused LSP lawyers of organizing 
demonstrations and creating civil unrest.  Legal Services in Venice, California 
was accused by local police officers of “supporting anti-police militants” and 
organizing citizens into “revolutionary forces”.  Legal services in Chicago 
petitioned for pardons for citizens involved in riots in 1968.  Senator Murphy of 
California accused the California Rural Legal Services Agency of representing 
known criminals.  Aligned with this was the narrative that, if LSP lawyers were 
successful at representing alleged criminals or improving the “quality” of 




Another mandate of the LSP was to build community relationships with 
public institutions such as the police department. Within this mandate to LSPs, 
public institutions were to be held responsible for services rendered on behalf of 
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 Gideon v Wainwright (1963) ruled that state courts are required to provide an attorney for 
criminal defendants who were unable to afford an attorney from a private law firm.   
11
 This was often a discretionary decision with local political consequences.  Lawyers were 
compelled to represent clients when they felt the state would not adequately provide a proper 
defense for someone the lawyer deemed innocent or wronged by the police. 
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the poor.  Most legal services cases in this arena were dealt with by conferences, 
threats of litigation, and educating clients of legal rights and procedures.  For 
example, legal services lawyers in Los Angeles brought a lawsuit on behalf of the 
black community against the Los Angeles Police Department citing them with 
illegal police behavior and harassment.  Similar lawsuits were filed in Cleveland, 
Washington D.C, and Camden.  The goal of these lawsuits were to change police 
practices, implement training in areas of race and poverty, and for recruitment of 
more officers - particularly minority police officers.  Also in New York, Legal 
Services filed suit against the New York Police Department on behalf of twelve 
women who were victims of domestic violence.  The objective of the lawsuit was 
to enforce the requirement that local police officials follow laws and procedures 
for domestic violence cases that were already in place.  Similar motions were 
made on behalf of domestic violence victims from legal services agencies in 
Florida, California, Oregon, and Vermont.  Advocates of the program claimed 
that LSP lawyers were influential in reducing police brutality, improving police 
response time, and securing the actual filing of police reports.  Legal services 
lawyers, though representing cases against Police Departments, often worked in 
concert with local police officers; these relationships were credited with reducing 
the likelihood of riots by using the judicial system to solve disputes peacefully.   
Conceptually, the availability of legal aid would serve as a deterrent for 
unfair or unjust treatment by police authorities (i.e., police brutality or not taking 
reports).
12
  If police services were underutilized by the poor due to social and 
political structure or resources, LSPs would attempt to correct the market 
inefficiency.  The examination of the victimization reports and reported crime 
records reveals a distinct difference between the actual and observed crime rate. 
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 During a 1969 Senate hearing, advocates of LSP boast on the effectiveness of legal service 
lawyers to intervene in riots, decrease police brutality, reduce illegal police conduct, and increase 
the relationship between the police and the poor community.  
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Boggess and Bound (1999) summarized the differences between Victimization 
Reports and the Uniform Crime Report and surmised that reporting plays a large 
role in the discrepancy.  According to Boggess and Bound, the large difference 
reflects reporting behavior of victims and witnesses as well as reporting behavior 
of the police.
13
  There are several reasons why this difference between actual and 
reported crime occurs.  First, the pecuniary gains from reporting are likely small if 
the possibility of recovery is near zero.  Also, the victim or observer of a crime is 
not likely to report if the criminal is of close relation or if retaliation is possible.  
Additionally, political pressure to keep crime rates down, the social economic 
status of victims, conviction rates, and various other reasons cause crime to go 
unreported.
14
  If some criminal offenses are under-reported due to lack of 
institutional responsibility or the victims perception of lack of institutional 
responsibility, legal services could work to increase the number of crimes 
reported and the number offenses cleared by arrest.
15
   
According to the mechanisms outlined above, the introduction of the LSP 
has two possible implications within a Becker type crime model.  For potential 
criminals (supply-side), the LSP increases the quality of criminals and as a result, 
decreases the marginal cost of committing a crime.  Consequently, this will 
decrease the number of crimes cleared by arrest, increase the number of crimes 
committed, and increase the number of crimes reported.  For non-criminals 
(demand for crime prevention), the LSP could improve police-community 
relationships which increases the reporting of crime.  Better policing and more 
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 Myers (1980) finds that the actual crime rates between 1970 and 1974 were 1.5 to 3 times larger 
than reports. 
14
 Couzens and Sieidman (1974) discuss how the production of crime rates depends on the victim 
perspective, the police perspective, and also political pressure.  Unobserved differences in any of 
these three areas can cause crime to be drastically under-reported across cities and vary over time.  
Also see Black (1970). 
15
 Legal services lawyers have been seen as improving relationships between the community and 
the police.  Many encounters of how the LSP have influenced behavior of local institutions are 
documented in congress subcommittee meetings between 1965 to 1974. 
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reporting would also lead to an increase in arrests which serves as a deterrent for 
committing future crimes.   
Combining the two offsetting effects, the prediction that follows is that 
LSPs could increase or decrease crime after legal services grants were received.  
Furthermore, both of these changes in crime would result in an increase in 
reported crime.  However, what is important from a social capital perspective is 
whether actual crime increased or decreased due to the establishment of LSPs.  
My analysis uses property values to shed light on this.   
II.  Data On Legal Service Grants and Crime 
Data on the recipients of federal legal services grants funded by the OEO 
were compiled from the National Archives Community Action Program 
(NACAP) files.  NACAP provides information on the city, county, and state for 
which the funds were received and the targeted communities.  Also, provided is 
the date the grant was issued, the amount of the grant, and a brief description for 
the intended purpose of the grant.  I use this information to match legal services 
grants to city level observations on crime and I use the date of the first grant to 
identify when the legal services program started.
16
   
Data on crime comes from the Uniform Crime Reporting: Offenses 
Known and Clearance by Arrest (UCR).  The data on crime includes monthly 
information on the number of unfounded offenses, actual offenses, offenses 
cleared by arrest, and offenses cleared involving individuals under the age of 18.  
The following offenses of interest are recorded in this database: murder and 
manslaughter, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle thefts. 
Also recorded is the number of offenses cleared by arrest for each of these 
criminal offenses.  
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 NACAP files do not provide information for grants received in 1969.  Data from Federal 
Outlays are used to supplement CAP data to provide grants in 1969. 
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City characteristics in this analysis are taken from the 1960, 1970, 1980, 
and 1990 Census City and County Books.  The city level demographic 
information is constructed by linearly interpolating between the 1960, 1970, 1980, 
and 1990 census.  To calculate the proportion of the population that are males 
between the ages of 15 to 24 and 25 to 39 for each city, I interpolated the 1960 
census county age profile to 1968 and used annual county age profiles from the 
Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results (SEER) from 1968-1985.  
The analysis consists of city level observations with crime statistics and 
census demographic information from 1960 to 1985 for 606 cities.  All cities in 
this sample have a population of over 25,000 residents in every year.  Table 1 
reports summary statistics for these cities from the 1960 census.  The average 
population in the sample is 98,515 residents with the median income of $6,004 
dollars ($48,019 in 2014 dollars).
17
  The final sample contains 208 cities that 
received legal services grants (treatment group) and 398 non grant cities 
(comparison group).  Cities that received legal services grants have a larger 
proportion of residents who are non-white and smaller proportion of residents 
with more than 12 years of schooling which is reflected with lower median 
incomes.  However, cities that received grants are similar to unfunded cities with 
regard to the proportion of residents who are men and between the ages of 15 to 
24 and 25 to 39, a key determinant of crime (Blumstein and Rosenfeld, 2008). 
III.  Event-Study Methodology 
The empirical strategy will take advantage of the variation in the location 
of LSPs.  Although there are key cross-sectional differences between funded and 
unfunded cities, the identification strategy is dependent on how crime evolves 
before the establishment of the legal services program.  Table 2 reports summary 
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 LSPs were located in larger cities, however, 103 of the 208 cities that received LSP grants had a 
population less than 100,000 residents in 1960 and 45 cities had a population less than 50,000.  
Every city with a population greater than 500,000 residents in 1960 received a legal service grant.   
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statistics for the log of criminal offenses available in the UCR between 1960 and 
1964.
18
  According to the table, cities that received legal services grants have 
much higher average crime rates before 1965.  This is not surprising as 
demographic characteristics from table 1 are known predictors of crime.  
Important for my research design, however, is that crime evolved similarly in 
treated and untreated cities prior to 1965.  This is consistent with changes in the 
percentage of the population in high crime age groups evolving similarly over 
time in treated and untreated places.  My analysis will account for the cross-
sectional differences by using city fixed effects to capture differences in cities that 
are unobservable but are constant over time.  Untreated cities in this analysis will 
help estimate how crime is evolving over time and provide a comparison group 
for how crime is expected to evolve after treatment.  The untreated cities in this 
sample provides a plausible comparison group if demographic characteristic as 
well as city and year fixed effects capture the difference in how crime evolves in 
treated cities versus untreated cities before the establishment of legal services 
programs.  A test of this assumption is embedded within the difference-in-
difference approached used in this analysis.  If crime evolves similarly in treated 
and untreated cities before the establishment legal services program, my analysis 
will capture any trend break in crime due to the introduction of legal services.  
The empirical strategy will also take advantage of the variation in the 
timing of the establishment of LSPs.  The key identifying assumption is that the 
timing of the establishment of LSPs is uncorrelated with other determinants of 
changes in crime.  The first test of this assumption is a regression of 1960 
demographic characteristics that are determinants of crime on the year LSPs was 
established.  The LSP was also supposed to be affiliated with university law 
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 Summary statistics are the average over 1960 to 1964 of offenses reported. 
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programs; so ex ante, one would predict that legal services would be in cities that 
have law schools.   
Table 3 reports weighted and unweighted estimates from ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions for the year grants were received.  I use an indicator 
variable equal to one if a city is located in a county that has a law school and 
another indicator variable for if the county has a medical school.  The medical 
school indicator captures the effect of a university versus a stand-alone law 
school.  This can distinguish whether timing of grants are affiliated with law 
schools or large universities.  Column 1 reports estimates from an unweighted 
OLS regression and column 2 reports from a weighted OLS regression (weighted 
by 1960 county population).
19
  In both columns, having a medical school or law 
school is associated with receiving legal services earlier.  However, having a 
medical school in the county is not statistically significant.  Law schools are 
weakly statistically significant in column 2.  According to table 3, demographic 
characteristics fail to predict when a city first received a grant. 
A second test of the identifying assumption is to compare the timing of the 
LSP with the pre-program reported crime rates and pre-program growth in 
reported crime.  Figure 1 plots the changes in log of total crime from 1960 to 
1964 and the reported crime in 1964 against the year of the LSP establishment.  
Both figures show that the timing of the LSP is uncorrelated with reported crime 
or changes in reported crime in the pre-period.
20
  These two tests provide 
statistical evidence that the variation in the timing of establishing LSPs were not 
determined by pre-period crime rates or predictors of crime.   
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 Weights are used to give more weight to cities that contribute more the population descriptive 
statistics used in the regression analysis. 
20
 The slope in panel A is -0.011 (0.0073) and panel B -0.0249 (.02082).  The slope for panel A & 
B are from univariate regressions of the crime on the year LSPs were established. 
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Legal services programs were rolled out over an 11 year interval.
21
  I use 
the variation in the timing and location of funding within an event-study 
framework to test for causality.  The event study framework lends itself well for 
testing the effects of an outcome before and after exposure to the treatment and 
provides another falsification test for how crime is evolving before treatment.
22
  
The pre-treatment effects test whether changes in the outcomes occur before the 
implementation of treatment.  I estimate the effects of federally funded legal 
services using the following linear regression: 
(1.) 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡,𝑠(𝑖) + ∑ 𝜋−𝜏
𝑞
𝜏=1 𝐷𝑖1(𝑡 − 𝑇
∗ = −𝜏) + ∑ 𝛿𝜏
𝑝
𝜏=1 𝐷𝑖1(𝑡 − 𝑇
∗ =
𝜏) + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the annual log number of offenses per 100,000 residents in city i in 
year t (t= 1960, 1961,…1985); 𝛾𝑖 is a set of city effects which control for 
unobservable city characteristics that are time invariant; 𝛼𝑡 is either a set of year 
effects or state-by-year effects (𝛼𝑠(𝑖),𝑡).  Year effects will absorb policies that will 
impact crime nationally such as the 1972 Supreme Court case ruling capital 
punishment cruel and unusual.  State-by-year effects captures time-varying state 
level changes such as the business cycle or policy changes (e.g. punishment, 
enforcement) which may influence the supply of criminal activity.  
The row vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡, consists of covariates from the 1960, 1970, 1980, and 
1990 census, which I have linearly interpolated between census years.
23
  The 
covariates are the proportion of the non-white population, the proportion of males 
between 15 to 24 years of age, the proportion of males between 25 to 39 years of 
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 Legal Services operated under the OEO until October of 1974 when it became the Legal Service 
Corporation. 
22
 For other papers using event study framework see Bailey (2013), Jacobson et al (1993), Kline 
(2010), and McCrary (2007). 
23
 Census information is gathered in the County and City Data Book and is publicly available at 
the ICPSR website.   
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age, percentage of population with more than 12 years of education, and family 
median income.  Because using the treatment may actually have an effect on the 
controls, I estimate the regression with and without the covariates from the census 
for robustness of the specification. 𝐷𝑖 is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
city ever received federally funded legal services.  1(𝑡 − 𝑇∗ = −𝜏) is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the observation year is – 𝜏 years from the date that the 
legal services grant is received or 1(𝑡 − 𝑇∗ = 𝜏) is equal to one if the observation 
year is 𝜏 years after the date legal services were first available. 1(𝑡 − 𝑇∗ = 0) is 
omitted due to collinearity where 𝑇∗ is the funding year for the legal services 
grant; q refers to the number of lags or years before legal services are funded, and 
p is the lead or years after legal services are funded.  To ensure the coefficients 
are well estimated, event time for 𝜏 > 10 and 𝜏 < -5 are grouped into endpoints, q 
= 6 and p = 11.  The endpoint coefficients are not estimated using a balanced 
sample of cities and will also give unequal weight to cities that receive federal 
grants very early or late in the sample.  These endpoints, therefore, are omitted 
from the presentation of results. 
In the sample, cities receive legal services grants between 1965 and 1975.  
A balanced event panel using UCR data on criminal offenses from 1960 to 1985 
will focus on five years before and ten years after federally funded legal services 
are received.  The coefficients of interest are 𝜋−𝜏, which are pre-treatment effects, 
and post-treatment effects 𝛿𝜏.  These estimates describe the dynamics of reported 
crime in funded cities before and after legal services grants are received.  If the 
econometric model captures the pre-legal services evolution of the dependent 
variable, the pre-treatment effects should be indistinguishable from zero.  The 
treatment effects, 𝛿𝜏, is the average change in the difference in criminal offenses 𝜏 
years after the city received the grant.   
17 
 
IV.  Results 
A. Using the Timing of First Grants to Identify Impact 
Using the estimates from equation 1, I plot pre-treatment effects and post-
treatment effects from a balanced panel.  Figure 2 plots the estimates from three 
different specifications of equation 1.  Model 1 is plotted in the solid line with no 
markers. It contains only city and year effects.  Model 2 is plotted with a solid line 
and circle markers and includes city and state by year effects.  Model 3 also 
includes city and state-by-year effects with additional city characteristics 
interpolated from 1960 to 1985 using the 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990 census data 
and is plotted with square markers.  I present 95-percent confidence intervals for 
model 2 and 3 by dashed lines.   The confidence intervals are constructed from 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered by city.  The sample consists of 
cities with population greater than 25,000 residents in every year but excludes 
New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago.  Presented are estimates where the 
natural log of crime is the dependent variable 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 for equation 1.  All regressions 
are estimated using the 1985 population as weights to correct heteroskedasticy 
related to city size in the error term.
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Figure 2 plots pre-treatment and post-treatment effects for federal legal 
services grants on log of total criminal offenses reported per 100,000 residents.  
Total crime is an unweighted aggregate of property crime and violent crime.  
Property crime includes burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft, whereas 
violent crime aggregates include murder, manslaughter, rape, assault, and 
robbery.  According to all three models, the point estimates for 𝜋−𝜏 are near zero 
or slightly less than zero but statistically insignificant.  After the first year of 
operations, changes in offenses reported are positive and statistically significant.  
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 Weighted least squares is used to make error term homoscedastic.  New York, Chicago, and Los 
Angeles are removed to avoid giving these cities enormous weight in addition to having cities to 
compare them with. 
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The log of actual offenses reported increases drastically over the next three years 
and is statistically significant.  Using model 3 estimates, total crime per 100,000 
residents increases 7 percent three years after treatment.  Three and four years 
after treatment, total crime reported begins to decrease and eventually becomes 
indistinguishable from zero.  The results are consistent with buildup of services 
within a community.  After the grant is received, neighborhood legal services will 
have to hire staff, build community support and rapport, while also accumulating 
exposure. 
Estimates in figure 3 are produced using weighted least squares and 
exclude New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles.  These cities are excluded to avoid 
giving them enormous weight.  More importantly, these cities lack a proper 
comparison within the treated or control samples, which is important because 
identification is dependent on both timing and location.
25
  Population weights are 
used in my analysis to gain efficiency when error term has heteroskedasticity 
related to city size.  However, weighted least squares (WLS) often lead to 
estimates that are less efficient than ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates 
(Haider, Solon, and Wooldridge, 2013).  In my analysis, weighted least square 
produces estimates of the pre-treatment effects that are smaller in absolute value 
and have smaller t ratios than OLS estimates.  Also post-treatment effects for 
WLS regressions are larger than OLS estimates and have larger t-ratios.  This is 
consistent with WLS procedure capturing the pre-period trend in crime.
26
   
B. Interpretation of the Impact of Federally Funded Legal Services 
The availability of legal services is associated with a large increase in 
crime as predicted under the context of Becker’s Crime Model.  The hump shape 
response indicates that there is an increase in crime followed by a decrease in 
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 Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York receive legal service grants in 1966.  
26
 Estimates including New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles as well as OLS regression are 
available upon request. 
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crime after legal services became available.  However, the hump shape response 
does not distinguish between changes in actual crime or the reporting of crime.  
On one hand, this result is consistent with LSPs increasing the demand for police 
service and reducing the demand for crime.  Advocates of the LSP boasted about 
its effectiveness in reducing police brutality, minimizing or stopping riots, 
increasing victim response time, and ensuring filing of police reports.  
Improvements in these areas should enhance the relationship between the poor 
and police.  Ensuring police filed reports alone will increase the reported crime 
rate without changes in criminal behavior.  By protecting the poor’s legal rights to 
adequate law enforcement protection and services, legal services could increase 
the likelihood that a crime is reported and also increase the likelihood that the 
report would be investigated.  In general, these effects will not only lead to more 
reporting but also increase the probability of arrest, given a criminal offense 
occurred.  
While the intertemporal response of reported crime provides evidence of 
changes in reporting behavior, I cannot dismiss the possibility of changes in 
criminal behavior.  In part, the hump shape response is also consistent with an 
increase in actual crime followed by a decrease in crime.  According to 
opponents, LSP lawyers decreased the probability of arrest and conviction.  The 
combination of these effects could embolden criminals and result in more crimes 
being committed.  Although not articulated by opponents, the decrease in crime 
could be a result of increased police effort to clear offenses by arrest.  Despite the 
conflicting view points, it is clear that the establishment of legal services 
increased reported crime in treated cities.   
C. Event-study results for Arrest and Number of Police Officers 
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Figure 3 plots pre-treatment and post-treatment effects for log of arrest per 
100,000 residents.
 27
  I have valid arrest data from 1963 to 1985; therefore, I only 
have one year for the pre-treatment.  As with reported crime, pre-treatment effects 
are zero and post-treatment effects are positive and statistically significant.  Worth 
noting is the magnitude of arrest compared to reported crimes.  In figure 2 total 
criminal offenses reported increased by 7 percent after three years and then by the 
fifth year after treatment, the effects were not distinguishable from zero.  Here, 
total arrests increased by 16 percent after three years and the post-treatment 
effects remain high for the next couple of years before declining to zero.  In this 
case, the response to legal services and the increase in reported crime resulted in a 
dramatic increase in arrests in treated cities.  The percentage increase in arrests 
after legal services become available is double the percentage increase in crimes 
reported.    
As mentioned earlier, legal services often filed laws suits which requested 
additional police officers and a more diverse police force.  Figure 4 plots pre-
treatment and post-treatment effects for the log of sworn police officers per 
100,000 residents.  Before legal services are available the pre-treatment effects 
are zero.  After legal services become available the log of sworn police officers 
increases over the next 10 years relative to untreated cities.  The post-treatment 
effects, clearly shows a large immediate increase in the log of sworn police 
officers after legal services are established.
28
  An increase of 2.2 percent in the 
first year is the largest increase over the next ten years.  The increase in sworn 
police officers in the first year is an average increase of 8 additional police 
officers in treated cities.  Using estimates of police elasticities from research on 
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 Mas (2006) also used clearance rates as a proxy for police performance. Here, by protecting the 
rights of the poor, should also be reflected in more effort and energy to doing better police work.  
Using clearance rates serves as a proxy. 
28
 Police employment data from the Annual Survey of Government provide results similar to the 
estimates displayed in figure 4. 
21 
 
crime and police from Levitt (1997, 2002) and McCrary (2002, 2013), this 
implies that violent crime would be expected to be reduced by 6 to 14 crimes per 
100,000 residents because of additional police officers.  The reduction in property 
crime would be between 25 and 94 crimes per 100,000 residents.   
D. Event-study results by UCR crime category 
Figure 5 plots pre-treatment effects and post-treatment effects from model 
3 for the effect of legal services on property and violent crimes reported.  Results 
for property crime show that five years before federal legal services grants, 
funded cities are indistinguishable from unfunded cities.  According to Model 3, 
the point estimates for 𝜋−𝜏 are zero or slightly less than zero but statistically 
insignificant. Three years after federally funded legal services are implemented, 
the number of crimes reported increased on average by 93 property crimes per 
100,000.  Three years after a city received a legal services grant, property crimes 
continued to grow at a steady pace.  Similar to property crimes, the pre-treatment 
effects for reported violent crimes are not statistically significant.  After the first 
year of operations, changes in violent offenses reported are positive and increased 
over the next 3 years. 
Figure 6 plots pre-treatment and post-treatment effects for log of criminal 
offenses reported per 100,000 residents for sub-categories of property and violent 
crimes.  Panel A displays the result for the log of murder per 100,000 residents.  
The estimates show a steady increase in the log of murders reported before and 
after treatment but the estimates never becomes statistically significant nor does it 
display hump-shape response.  After legal services begin, the log of rapes per 
100,000 residents and the log of robberies per 100,000 residents reported increase 
and are statistically significantly.  Panel C and D plot treatment effects for assault, 
burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.  Pre-treatment effects for larceny are 
positive and statistically different from zero.  Post-treatment effects are positive 
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and statistically different from zero after a few years.  Motor vehicle theft and 
burglaries post-treatments are positive, statistically different from zero, and 
follow the hump shape response of total crimes.   
Property and violent crimes, as well as total crime, responded in a similar 
fashion to the establishment of legal services.  The post-treatment effects of 
murder and manslaughter are not statistically significant which support the notion 
that legal services increased reported crime and not actual crime.  Murder and 
manslaughter are reported fairly accurately and proxies for changes in actual 
crime. The zero post-treatment effects for murder and manslaughter show that 
LSPs were unlikely to increase actual crime.  Also, crimes that are typically 
under-reported, such as rape, display the largest increase.  This is consistent with 
an increase in reporting in places where legal services are established.  
The notion that crime is decreasing while reporting is increasing is not 
unique in the crime literature.
29
  Boggess and Bound (1997) showed that reported 
crime increased in the UCR in the 1980’s while crime decreased according to the 
National Crime Survey.
30
  They concluded that overall criminal activity decreased 
by virtue of the fact that the murder rate declined over the sample period, while 
reporting over the sample period increased.  Consistent with their story, my 
results indicate that the impact of LSPs on murder and manslaughter are 
statistically insignificant although the post-treatment estimates are positive.   
 However, other criminal categories that are reported somewhat accurately 
indicate that crime may actually be increasing due to legal services.  Two 
categories that are likely to be reported somewhat accurately are robberies and 
                                                 
29
 Levitt (1998) makes a similar argument about the effect of police on the reporting of crime.  
Levitt argues that an increase in police officers increases the likelihood that a crime is reported and 
reduces that amount of actual crime that occurs. 
30
 National Crime Survey was implemented in 1972 to collect data on victimization.  The data is 
administered by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and available at the ICPSR.  The NCS provides 
information about crimes reported and not reported to the police as well as provides information 
about the victim and the offender.  The increase in reporting overtime is also substantiated by 
Biderman and Lynch (1991). 
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motor vehicle theft (Bogges and Bound, 1997; Levitt, 1998).  According to figure 
6, the post-treatment effects are positive and statistically significant.  If LSPs are 
improving reporting of crimes, it is reasonable to assume that murders and motor 
vehicle theft would be unaffected.  However, I find large effects for motor vehicle 
theft and a positive effect on murder.  It is quite possible that legal services are 
associated with increases in actual crime or are associated with events that 
increased crime.   
V.  Discussion 
A. Legal Services and Property Values 
Evidence thus far indicates that the establishment of legal services 
programs increase reported crime.  These estimates imply that LSPs are 
associated with an increase in reported crime of roughly 7 percent.  Legal services 
are also associated with an increase in arrest and the number of police officers in 
treated cities.  All together these results are consistent with legal services reducing 
crime and increasing social capital by requiring citizens and public institutions to 
become more responsible for community development.  However, they may also 
reflect an increase in crimes committed.    
One attempt to distinguish between changes in actual crime versus 
reported crime is to examine changes in the value of homes.  Reducing crime will 
make communities safer and consequently influence property values in treated 
cities.  Conversely, an increase in crime would reduce them.  This is consistent 
with Lynch and Rasmussen (2010) which showed that housing prices are highly 
discounted in high crime areas.  Also an increase in criminal activities or an 
increase in the number of potential criminals can negatively influence the value of 
homes (Coldwell, Dehring, and Lash; 2000; Linden and Rockoff; 2008).  The race 
riots of the 1960s have been linked to lower property values in 1980 by Collins 
and Margo (2007).  Lastly, Pope and Pope (2010) showed that there is a negative 
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relationship between crime and property values.  They conclude that cities 
displaying the largest decrease in crime in the 1990s also had the largest increase 
in property values by the year 2000.  If legal services decrease crime, the increase 
in social capital should be reflected in the property value of homes.  To test this 
hypothesis I will use the median property value from 1960, 1970, and 1980 
census as the dependent variable similar to Collins and Margo.   
There is caution required in using the median property value as a measure 
of welfare.  In part, is likely that users of legal services were not home owners and 
property value will not capture changes in the welfare of the poor.  Additionally, 
changes in the property value in high crime areas may not impact the value of 
property in low crime areas or the median home owner.  However, policing and 
criminal activity is a city level statistic and can have spillover effects within a 
city.  Policing high crime areas and minimizing the opportunity for crime to 
spread outside of high crime areas could be reflected in the median property value 
of all home owners.  Therefore, using median property value is a modest attempt 
to estimate the causal effect of LSPs on the welfare of the poor and the 
community as a whole.   
To analyze the impact of LSPs on property values, I estimate the 
following difference-in-difference regression: 
(2) 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿𝐿𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑖,𝑡. 
The dependent variable is the log of the median residential property value for all 
home owners in city i in year t from 1960, 1970, and 1980 Decennial Census.  
LSP is equal to 𝐷𝑖1(𝑡 − 𝑇
∗ > 0) which is an indicator variable that is equal to one 
if a legal services project is operating in city i before census year t.  The row 
vector 𝑋𝑖,𝑡, consists of covariates from the 1960, 1970, and the 1980 census.  The 
covariates are the natural log of the following: the proportion of the non-white 
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population, percentage of population with more than 12 years of education, and 
the population per square mile.  Also included is an indicator variable equal to 
one if a riot has occurred in city i before census year t.  The riot data comes 
courtesy of Collins and Margo (2007).  This data consists of detailed information 
of riots occurring between 1964 and 1971. 
Table 4 displays the results from equation 2 where the dependent variable 
is the log of the median residential property value for all home owners. According 
to column 1, property values are two percent higher in cities that receive legal 
services.  Column 2 adds additional covariates: the log of median income and log 
of the percentage of the population with 12 or more years of education.  Estimates 
in column 2 further support that the impact of LSPs on property value is positive 
and the results are larger and statistically significant.  According to column 3, 
cities that receive legal services earlier are associated with higher property values 
in 1970 and 1980 relative to cities that did not receive legal services or receive 
legal services later.  Higher property values are consistent with LSPs increasing 
social capital and making these communities safer and better off.  The increase in 
social capital through changes in reporting, according to advocates, was driven by 
lawyers improving the relationship between the poor and institutions that 
interacted with the poor. 
To aggregate the effect of LSPs on property values, I use the same 
procedure used in Collins and Margo.  Using the estimated effects in column 2, I 
predict the log-value of median property values in 1980 for each city.  Using these 
predicted values, I calculate a counterfactual for property values in treated cities 
by subtracting the estimated value-added due to legal services.  Using the number 
of owner occupied housing in each city as weights, I calculate the weighted 
average of property values in 1980 across cities to construct an average 
counterfactual value of homes.  The weighted average of property values in the 
non-LSP counterfactual is $16,273.  The weighted average of the actual property 
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in 1980 is $17,370.   The difference between the actual and counterfactual 
property values implies an additional $1,097 in property value due to the presence 
of LSPs.  The average number of owner occupied housing in 1980 across cities is 
22,200.  Using this number, legal services is associated with a 24 million dollar 
increase in property values by 1980.   
B. Using Rioting to Distinguish Changes in Reported Crime 
It is reasonable to be concerned that the significant increase in reported 
crime after exposure to federally funded legal services is a direct consequence of 
riots that occur during this time period.
31
  The inclusion of year fixed effects will 
capture national events that increase crime across cities.  However, all riots are 
not triggered by national events.  Therefore, year fixed effects and state by year 
fixed effects will not capture changes in local sentiments that may result in riots.  
If the increase in reported crime is purely a consequence of rioting, then legal 
services were either established in locations where rioting would occur or in 
places where rioting was the most intense or severe.  Although riots are 
considered spontaneous events (Collins & Margo 2007), it is likely that LSPs are 
established in places where the tension between institutions and the 
poor/minorities is high.  As mentioned before, the program was considered an 
anti-rioting initiative by advocates and thus selection on the likelihood of riots is 
plausible but difficult to test.   
To examine these concerns, I use riot data from Collins and Margo (2007).  
Included this data is a riot severity index which compares riots across cities in the 
sample.  I use the riot intensity index to test how rioting effect my estimates.  
Table 5 displays estimates for the log of total crime per 100,000 residents.  
Column 1 includes estimates of model 3 from figure 3.  Column 2 displays 
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 According to data from Collins and Margo (2007), 409 riots are recorded in 193 cities in the 
sample.  Event-studies estimates show that riots are associated with higher level of crime after the 
first riot in a city occurs.   These estimates are not presented but are available upon request.   
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estimates from model 3 including a variable for riot intensity in city j in year t.  
Estimating the effect of legal services on total criminal offenses reported 
accounting for rioting does not change the pre- and post-treatment effects.  The 
coefficient on rioting is positive and statistically significant but small.  There are 
various explanations why this occurs.  One reason is that many of the riots in 
Collin and Margo’s data are relatively small.  Also, more intense riots may reflect 
changes in national sentiment and are captured by year fixed effects.  Lastly, 
changes in crime could be a post-riot effect related to changes in demographics 
and economic activity due to rioting. 
C. Other War on Poverty Grants 
Another reasonable concern is that any impact of the LSP is just a 
reflection of other programs introduced in President Johnson’s War on Poverty.  
The LSP operated within Community Action Agencies until 1969.  The link 
between legal services and community action agencies are not linear in the sense 
that there are locations with legal services and without community action agencies 
(and vice versa).  Table 6 reports pre-treatment and post-treatment effects for the 
Office of Economic Opportunity grants on log of total criminal offenses reported 
per 100,000 residents.  In column 1, the event is the timing of the first Head-Start 
grant, column 2, uses Community Action Agency grants, and column 3 uses 
Legal Services grants.  Head-Start provides a placebo test since this program was 
not linked to community action agencies.  While the Community Action Agency 
is a test of the litany of programs housed as Community Action Programs.  
According to table 6, pre-treatment and post-treatment effects in columns 1 and 2 
are not statistically significant.  If changes in reported crime were due to the 
influx of resources devoted toward fighting poverty and not legal services, 
column 2 would show a significant decrease or increase in reported crime.  
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However, reported crime only changes when the event is the establishment of the 
legal service program. 
VI.  Conclusion 
In 1960 many legislative acts and federal programs were implemented to 
increase the quality of life of the poor, reduce poverty, and improve urban 
communities.  This declaration of reform is reflected in the War on Poverty 
initiated in 1964 by President Lyndon B. Johnson.  However, introducing social 
programs such as Head Start and Job Corps was deemed too small according to 
President Johnson.  At Howard University's Commencement in 1965 he stated, “It 
is not enough just to open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens must have the 
ability to walk through those gates.”  The LSP was established to equip the poor 
with the tools to do just this.  Fifty years later however, research has failed to 
evaluate the impact of the LSP, partially because of the difficulty with quantifying 
its effects. 
Federally funded legal services attorneys are historically credited with 
advocating on behalf of the poor to stop police brutality, increase response times 
to victims, ensure that reports are filed and investigated, and change policing 
policies.  However, individuals that opposed the program identified it as an anti-
government program that emboldened criminals.  My results are consistent with 
its proponents rather than its opponents, showing the establishment of legal 
services as increasing the demand for law enforcement services;  also, that the 
legal services program is associated with places having higher property values.   
These results suggest that the LSP was impactful and this would have had primary 
importance for individuals who could not articulate grievances before the program 
began.  Crime is one of many areas in which this program could have influenced 
how public institutions interacted with the poor.  Other implicitly affected areas 
could include: welfare recipients, divorce, evictions, as well as changes in debt 
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repayment which can greatly change an individual’s and a community’s economic 
outlook.  This study as a whole indicates that the LSPs had far reaching 
implication on the poor and urban communities.  Providing impoverished 
communities advocates to articulate grievance can increase demand for under-
utilized goods as well as improve institutions that may be inefficiently servicing 
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Figure 1.  Crime Rates before the Legal Services Program Began 
A. Δ in Log of Total Crime 1960-1964 
 
 
B. Log of Total Crime per 100,000 Residents 1964 
 
Notes: Panel A & B: Regression coefficients and predicted values are from univariate regressions 
of the dependent variable crime on the year LSPs were established. The slope in panel A is -0.011 
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Figure 2.  Estimates of the Effects of LSP on Log of Total Crimes 
 
 
Figure 3.  Estimates of the Effects of LSP on Log of Total Arrest  
 
Notes: Figures 2 & 3: Model 1 includes City, C, and year, Y, effect. Model 2 include city and 
state-by-year, S-Y, effects. Model 3 adds covariates from county and city data book, X, to model 
2.  Covariates include median household income, percentage of population under age of 5, 
percentage of the population over the age of 64, percentage of population nonwhite, and the 
percentage of population with 12 or more years of education, which are from the decennial census.  
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by city are presented for model 2 & 3.  Each 
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Figure 4.  Estimates of the Effects of LSP on Log of Sworn Police 
 
 
Figure 5.  Estimate of the Effects of LSP on Log Property and Violent Crime  
 
Figures 4 & 5: Model 1 includes City, C, and year, Y, effect. Model 2 include city and state-by-
year, S-Y, effects. Model 3 adds covariates from county and city data book, X, to model 2.  
Covariates include median household income, percentage of population under age of 5, percentage 
of the population over the age of 64, percentage of population nonwhite, and the percentage of 
population with 12 or more years of education, which are from the decennial census.  
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by city are presented for model 2 & 3.  Each 
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Figure 6.  Estimates of the Effects of Legal Services Grants on Log Crime Per 100,000 Residents 
A. Murder        B. Rapes and Robbery 
  
C. Burglary and Motor Vehicle Theft    D. Assault and Larceny 
  
Notes: Regression analysis include city and state-by-year fixed effects as well as median household income, percentage of population under age 
of 5, percentage of the population over the age of 64, percentage of the non-white population, and the percentage of population with 12 or more 
years of education, which are from the decennial census.  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by city are presented.  Each 
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Table 1. Characteristics of Cities from 1960 
              Received 
Grant from 
1965-1975 
  Non-Grants 
Cities 
     All Cities   A. 1960 City Characteristics 
             (N=606)   (N=208)   (N=398) 
Means 
        
 
Population 






















Proportion of population in cities 

































Proportion of residents 
       
 



















 with 12 years of education  43.2  41.5  46.7 
Source: Table displays weighted averages from the 1960 Decennial Census.  




Table 2. Summary Statistics for UCR Data 





Criminal Offenses  
 All Cities 1960-1964 
            (N=606) (N=208) (N=398) 
Mean Per 100,000 Residents 
































1,773  3,585  827  
  
Motor vehicle theft 
 




3,041  6,396  1,288  
Growth from 1960 to1964 








0.294 0.267 0.308 
  Total     0.295 0.285 0.299 
Source: Table averages are from the UCR from 1960 to 1964.  Criminal 
offenses reported in the UCR are from the Uniform Crime Report 





Table 3. The Relationship between First Legal Services Grants and the 1960 
Census Demographics 
    (1) (2) 
 
Dependent Variable: 
Year of first federal legal service grant 
 
      
Law School in County -0.353 -0.664* 
  
[0.307] [0.345] 








population per square mile -0.363 -0.164 
  
[0.234] [0.180] 
Proportion of residents 
  
 












men between the age of 25 and 39 years of age -0.189 0.0160 
  
[1.967] [2.148] 
    Weighted 
  
X 
State fixed effects X X 
Observations 208 208 
R-squared 0.468 0.494 
Note: Each column reports estimates from a separate linear regression. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are corrected for clustering with state and presented in brackets. Independent 
Variables are from the 1960 Decennial Census.  Columns 1 & 2 use the 1960 population as 




Table 4. The Relationship between Legal Services and Property Values 
    (1) (2) (3) 
 
DV: Log of Median Residential Property Value for All Home Owners 
  
    
 






Riot -0.0943*** -0.0421** -0.0468*** 
  
[0.0250] [0.0183] [0.0166] 
 
Time Since LSP Established 
  
0.00357*** 
    
[0.00130] 
The Natural Log of 





   
[0.123] [0.121] 
 




   
[0.0939] [0.0922] 
 
% of pop Nonwhite 0.0612* 0.118*** 0.122*** 
  
[0.0352] [0.0235] [0.0232] 
 
Population per square mile 0.0740* 0.106*** 0.108*** 
  
[0.0417] [0.0237] [0.0231] 
     Observations 1,818 1,818 1,818 
R-squared 0.502 0.668 0.671 
Number of Cities 606 606 606 
Notes: Table display least-squares estimates obtained from estimating equation 
2. The dependent variable is the log of the median residential property value for 
all home owners provided in the City and County Data Books from 1962, 1972, 
and 1983.  Covariates are also from the City and County Data Books. Riot 
indicator variable is based on data from Carter and Margo (2007).  All 
regressions include year fixed effects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
clustered by city are presented beneath each estimate in brackets. Each 
regression is weighted by 1985 population and excludes New York, Chicago, 




Table 5. Event Study Estimates for Log of Total Crime with Riot Intensity 
    (1) (2) 
DV: Total Crime per 100,000 Residents 













































































  Riot Intensity 
 
0.00202*** 
   
[0.000623] 
    Observations 15,756 15,756 
R-squared 0.887 0.887 
Number of cities 606 606 
Notes: Table display weighted least-squares estimates obtained from estimating equation 1. Column 1 
corresponds to model 3.  Column 2 includes a Riot intensity variable is based on data from Carter and Margo 
(2007).  Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by city are presented beneath each estimate in 
brackets. .  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 6. Event Study Estimates for Log of Total Crime by OEO Grant 
  (1) (2) (3) 
DV: Log of Total Crime per 100,000 Residents 
Years Before Treatment    
 -5 0.0275 0.0373 0.00502 
 
[0.0242] [0.0223] [0.0180] 
-4 0.0242 0.0217 0.00439 
 
[0.0205] [0.0185] [0.0153] 
-3 0.0169 0.0151 0.0119 
 
[0.0163] [0.0155] [0.0145] 
-2 0.0108 0.0155 -0.00381 
 
[0.0118] [0.0116] [0.0117] 
-1 -0.00136 -0.00300 -0.0157* 
 
[0.00782] [0.00725] [0.00837] 
Years After Treatment 
  1 0.00401 -0.00713 0.0381*** 
 
[0.00744] [0.00752] [0.0111] 
2 0.00998 -0.00137 0.0528*** 
 
[0.0119] [0.0112] [0.0125] 
3 0.0149 0.00741 0.0724*** 
 
[0.0153] [0.0146] [0.0166] 
4 0.0224 0.00868 0.0611*** 
 
[0.0191] [0.0182] [0.0188] 
5 0.0249 0.00600 0.0414** 
 
[0.0224] [0.0210] [0.0201] 
6 0.0264 -0.00233 0.0216 
 
[0.0248] [0.0235] [0.0224] 
7 0.0141 -0.0114 0.0154 
 
[0.0266] [0.0257] [0.0234] 
8 0.00125 -0.0249 0.000119 
 
[0.0286] [0.0276] [0.0257] 
9 -0.00722 -0.0327 -0.00746 
 
[0.0300] [0.0287] [0.0278] 
10 0.000896 -0.0404 -0.00191 
 
[0.0314] [0.0299] [0.0272] 
    OEO Grants Head Start CAA LSP 
    Observations 15,756 15,756 15,756 
R-squared 0.858 0.858 0.887 
Number of cities 606 606 606 
Notes: Table displays least-squares estimates obtained from estimating equation 1.  Column 1 uses 
the first Head-Start Grant as the event while Columns 2 and 3 uses the first Community Action 
Agency and Legal Services Program as the event respectively.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
